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INTRODUCTION

In January of 2001, a New York court issued an order affirming a
plaintiff's ability to bring suit against a law firm partnership for dis
criminatory acts that occurred during her tenure as an associate at the
firm.1 The plaintiff, Stacy Ballen-Stier, joined Hahn & Hessen, L.L.P.
as an associate, and, on January 1, 1997, the firm invited her to join the
partnership.2 According to Ms. Ballen-Stier's complaint, the words and
actions of a fellow partner, Mr. Blejwas, created a hostile and abusive

I . Ballen-Stier v. Hahn & Hessen, L.L.P.. 727 N.Y.S.2d 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
2. Id.
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work environment3 and continued to plague her "even when [she] was
away from the office."4 Ms. Ballen-Stier alleged she was the victim of
sexual harassment that began when she was an associate and contin
ued for a significant period after she became a partner.5 While permit
ting Ms. Ballen-Stier to proceed with the claims involving acts that
occurred when she was an associate, the court order dismissed the
claims regarding harassment that occurred after her promotion to
partner.6 Although the alleged harassment continued in the same
3. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was one of the first courts to
acknowledge that sexual harassment could be actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1%4. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988-95 (D.C. Cir. 1 977). Today, courts classify
sexual harassment claims as either quid pro quo claims, involving "[u]nwelcome sexual ad
vances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"by
an actor relying on apparent or actual authority to force the subject of the harassment to
comply, or, as hostile work environment claims, alleging sexual misconduct that "has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or cre
ating an intimidating . . . or offe nsive working environment." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 65 ( 1986) (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR § 1604.ll(a), (a)(3) (1985) (in
ternal quotations omitted)); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); H arris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17,
20-22 {1993); CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 942-61 (200 1 ); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN { 1 979) (providing the original
terminology for the two forms of sexual harassment adopted by lower courts and, eventually,
the United States Supreme Court in Meritor). Ms. Ballen-Stier filed suit under New York
antidiscrimination law. Ballen-Stier, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22. New York courts apply the same
legal standard federal courts apply in Title VII litigation to determine whether behavior
amounts to actionable harassment. See Bennett v. Progressive Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 190,
203 n.4 (N.D. N.Y. 2002) (citing Martin v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 115
F. Supp. 2d 307, 3 1 1 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also infra note 6. It is notable, however, that the
standard for determining employer liability under New Yo�k human rights law diffe rs from
the standard federal courts apply in Title VII litigation. See Bennett, 255 F.2d at 210 (ex
plaining that "employer liability under [New York Human Rights Law] is not judged under
respondeat superior, but instead requires a more stringent showing, in particular, that the
employer had knowledge of and acquiesced in, or subsequently condoned" the behavior that
is the subject of the litigation (citation omitted)); see also id. at 210 n.6 ("The New York
Court of Appeals has yet to determine whether they will follow the Ellerth and Faragher
guidelines regarding employer vicarious liability." (citing Vitale v. Rosina Food Prod., Inc.,
727 N.Y.S.2d 2 1 5, 2 1 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001))). While quite interesting, the diffe ring stan
dards of employer liability are beyond the scope of this Note.
4. Ballen-Stier, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22. To present a cognizable claim for sexual harass
ment, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant behaved in a manner that was both objec
tively and subjectively offensive.
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abu
sive work environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive - is beyond Title Vll's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjec
tively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the
conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VI I violation.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 2 1 -22. To satisfy the objective element of the inquiry, a plaintiff must
present evidence that a reasonable person would have found that the behavior in question
amounted to harassment severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile and abusive work
environment. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742. The subjective element of the standard queries
whether the behavior actually offe nded the plaintiff. See Harris, 5 1 0 U.S. at 20-22; Meritor,
477 U.S. at 59.
5. Ballen-Stier, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
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manner before and after her promotion, the court reasoned that Ms.
Ballen-Stier's status as a partner prevented her from bringing the
claims relating to harassment she experienced after her promotion.7
D iscrimination against partners in law firms presents a unique legal
issue.8 While the Supreme Court has recognized that Title VII protects
law firm associates from discriminatory acts committed by supervising
partners,9 the circuits are split on the issue of whether Title VII covers
partners alleging to be victims of discrimination.1 0 In accordance with

6. Ballen-Stier alleged that she was the victim of harassment and an adverse employ
ment action because of her sex. hi. Under the New York statute proscribing employment
discrimination it is unlawful for:
an employer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, national
origin, sexual orientation, sex, disability. genetic predisposition or carrier status. or
marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge
from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compen
sation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 l(a) (2001). The New York statute mirrors the language of the
federal statute prohibiting employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
The text of Title VII states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em
ployer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
Ms. Ballen-Stier may have chosen to file suit under state antidiscrimination law because
an earlier decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the theory that a partner
could claim to be an employee and file suit under Title VII. See Hyland v. New Haven
Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Hyland I] (finding that "[i]t
is generally accepted that the benefits of the [federal) antidiscrimination statutes . . . do not
extend to those who properly are classified as partners").
7. Ballen-Stier, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (citing Levy v. Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis,
628 N.Y.S.2d 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)).
8. While this Note focuses on discrimination experienced by partners in law firm part
nerships, it argues for a broader understanding of who qualifies as an employee under Tille
VII. The author recognizes that law firms increasingly elect to organize their businesses
using forms other than the partnership model. For a discussion of the contemporary devel
opment of the various business forms available to law firms see infra notes 50-72 and accom
panying text. For a sampling of the diverse circumstances in which the partner-employee
question has arisen, see Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982. 985 ( 1 st Cir. 1997) (raising the
question of whether a law firm partner qualifies as an employee); Simpson v. Ernst &
Young, 100 F.3d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 1996) (raising the question of whether a partner in an
accounting firm qualifies as an employee); Hyland/, supra note 6, 794 F.2d at 796 (examin
ing the defendant professional corporation's argument that radiologists who owned and
managed a corporation could nol qualify as employees because of their role as partners in
the business): and EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd. Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1 1 77-79 (7th Cir. 1984)
(discussing whether shareholders of a law firm organized as a professional corporation qual
ify as employees).
9. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 ( 1998) (holding that under Title
VII an employer is vicariously liable for the acts of a supervisor whose sexual harassment of
subordinates created a hostile work environment).
10. While the Second and Seventh Circuits have adopted a per se rule excluding part
ners from the definition of employee, see Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793 (2d. Cir. 1986):
Burke v. Friedman. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977), the First, Ninth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits have adopted the economic realities test for partners and other executives or busi
ness owners claiming employee status, see Serapion, 119 F.3d at 985; Simpson, 100 F.3d 436

1070

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1067

well-established principles of jurisdiction, plaintiffs seeking protection
under Title VII must fall within the purview of the statute.11 Title VII
covers "employers" and "employees."12 Courts determine who quali
fies as an "employer" or an "employee" by looking to the statutory
definitions of the terms,13 and they decline to exercise jurisdiction if
the party alleging discrimination does not qualify as an employee14 or
the party accused of discriminating is not an employer as defined by
the statute.15
While the plain language of Title VII explicitly forbids employers
from treating employees less favorably because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin,16 the statute fails to offer a substantive defini
tion of who qualifies as an employee. An employee, according to the
definitional provision, is "an individual employed by an employer."17
This circular definition offers trial courts inadequate guidance for de
termining who should be included or excluded from the definition of
employee.18 The definitional provisions of other antidiscrimination

(6th Cir. 1996); Strother v. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996); Fountain v.
Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1991); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 268
(JOthCir. 1987).
11. See, e.g., Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d at 796 (indicating that the antidiscrimina
tion statutes offer protection only to employees and only when an employer has acted in
violation of the statute's provisions).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (defining "employer"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000)
(defining "employee").
13. See, e.g., Hyland /, supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986) (indicating that the
antidiscrimination statutes offer protection for individuals who were employees when the
relationship with the defendant employer terminated and stating that the term employer,
defined broadly by the statute, includes individuals, governments, government agencies, po
litical subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representa
tives, mutual companies, joint stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, and
trustees). Only businesses with fifteen or more employees fall within the purview of Title
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). In circumstances involving law firms with a small number of part
ners and associates, determining who qualifies as an employee directly impacts the court's
ability to exercise jurisdiction and actually reach the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Burke, 556
F.2d at 868-70.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). For a definition of "employee" and an explanation of the
term's significance for the purposes of this Note. see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
1 5. See generally Deanne M. Mosely & William C. Walter, The Significance of the
Classification of Employment Relmionships in Determining Exposure to Liability, 67 MISS.
L.J. 613, 628 (1998).
16. Title VII establishes: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em
ployer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
18. See. e.g Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
ambiguity of this definition as it arises under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and Employee Retirement Income Security Act). One commentator refers to the interplay
of the definitions for employee and employer as "magnificent circularity," finding the defini.•
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statutes such as the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA'') contain similarly
ambiguous language.19
While there is hope that a decision resolving the issue is
forthcoming,20 the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question
of whether or not partners qualify as employees under Title VII. To
evaluate whether or not partners can claim employee status for the
purposes of Title VII, lower courts have relied on precedent address
ing related issues.21 In resolving the partner-employee question, most
courts apply dicta from the seminal case Hishon v. King & Spalding.22
In Hishon , the Court considered a female associate's claim that the de
fendant law firm partnership discriminated against her because of her

tion of employee "virtually useless." See Daniel Kleinberger, A Focus on Unincorporated
Businesses: "Magnificent Circularity" and the Clmrkendoose: LLC Members and
. Federal
Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 477, 481, 492 (1997).
19. The terms "employee" and "employer" are ill-defined in other antidiscrimination
statutes. The ADEA defines "employee" as "an individual employed by any employer." 29
U.S.C. § 630(f) (2003). The ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12111(4) (2003), the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2003) ("ERISA"), and the Family Medical Leave
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2003), share this definition. All of these statutes derive their defini
tion of employee from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 203(e) (2003) (defining em
ployee as "any individual employed by an employer"). The similarities in the language and
purpose of these statutes have led courts to regard the statutes as standing in pari parssu and
to treat precedent interpreting one statute as instructive in resolving similar claims brought
under another statute. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979);
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997) ("We regard Title VII, ADEA,
ERISA, and FLSA as standing in pari pars.vu and endorse the practice of treating judicial
precedents interpreting one such statute as instructive in decisions involving another.");
Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Since [the] statutes have a similar
purpose - to stamp-out discrimination in various forms - cases construing the definitional
provisions of one are persuasive authority when interpreting the others."). While the simi
larity in language and underlying purpose - the elimination of discrimination in employ
ment - is undisputed, the question of whether or not considering the authority persuasive
across statutes works to the benefit of each covered group is disputable. See George
Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491 (1995).
20. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterol
ogy Associates, 271 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 31 {U.S. Oct. 1,
2002) (No. 01-1435), in which the Ninth Circuit declined the plaintiff-shareholder's request
to apply the economic realities test and held that shareholders in a professional corporation
qualify as employees. The issue presented before the Court is whether or not a shareholder
in a professional corporation qualifies as an employee under the ADA for the purpose of
determining if the defendant-employer has the requisite number of employees to satisfy the
jurisdictional trigger./cf. Resolution of this question will likely entail discussion of the defini
tion of "employee" for both the purposes of determining who qualifies as an employee under
the statute and for the purpose of determining if the employer has the requisite number of
employees. Since the definition of employee is interpreted similarly under different antidis
crimination statutes, see supra note 19, the definition or standard adopted by the Court may
resolve the question of whether or not partners can claim employee-status under Title VII.
21. See, e.g., Hyland /, supra note 6, 794 F.2d at 797 (describing Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) as influential in determining whether a partner can qualify as an
employee); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (same).
22. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
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sex in the decision not to promote her to partner.23 Ruling in favor of
the plaintiff, the Court opined that consideration for partnership con
stituted a term, condition, or privilege of employment and evidence
that the firm considered an impermissible characteristic, namely the
plaintiff's sex, in the selection process was subject to scrutiny under
the provisions of Title VII.24 The Court held that Title VII explicitly
forbids discrimination against a member of a protected class on the
basis of an immutable characteristic when deciding to promote associ
ates to partner.25 Hishon left unresolved the issue of whether a partner
facing analogous circumstances - discrimination based on her sex could bring a Title VII claim against her partnership.26
In response to the question of who qualifies as an employee, most
circuit courts have adopted either a per se rule or an economic
realities test.27 To varying degrees, these two approaches rely on lan
guage from Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon.28 According
to the concurrence, partners in traditional law firm partnerships do not
require the protection of Title VII because of the intimate nature of a
partnership.29 Justice Powell's concurrence assumes that partners,
having contributed similar amounts to the firm's capital structure, are
co-owners of the business, participants in the firm's management
structure, and contributors to the firm's decisionmaking process, which
is characterized by common agreement.30
Relying on Justice Powell's concurrence, courts adopting the first
method of analysis employ a per se rule to exclude partners from the
definition of employee and to prevent partners from invoking Title
VII against partnerships.31 Some courts using a per se rule have
applied the rule exclusively to businesses organized as partnerships
with management officials titled partners.32

23. lfishon, 467 U.S at 72.
24. Id. at 74-76.
25. Id. at 74.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 10.
28. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d at 987 (lst Cir. 1997) (citing Hishon as sup
port for adopting the economic realities test); Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d
Cir. 1986) (citing Hislum for the proposition that when the indicia of partnership are not
present the individual is an employee entitled to Title VII coverage).
29. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The relationship among law part
ners contemplates that decisions important to the partnership normally will be made by
common agreement . . . or consent among the partners.").
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Hylancl I, supra note 6. 794 F.2d at 797; Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867,
869-70 (7th Cir. 1977).
32. See Hyland/, supra note 6, 794 F.2d at 797. In Hyland, the court addressed the issue
of whether the plaintiff, an officer, director, and shareholder in a professional corporation,
could be considered an employee under the ADEA. Id. The defendant corporation argued
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Courts adopting the second approach inquire as to whether the
plaintiff-partner's economic reality, meaning her actual level of owner
ship and control, provides her with sufficient authority to combat dis
crimination levied against her.33 These courts reject the argument that
partners in law firm partnerships must be exempted from Title VII
coverage by virtue of their job title or the law firm's chosen business
form.34 Instead, these courts propose a case-by-case analysis of the
partner's relationship with the defendant-business and the partner's
participation in the firm's ownership and decisionmaking processes.35
The economic realities test aims to discern whether the partner alleg
ing discrimination is "so dominated in or by the organization that he
or she is really like an employee, with corollary susceptibility to dis
crimination. "36
In recent years, many structural and organizational changes within
law firms have complicated the partner-employee analysis.37 In the
years after Hishon, firms began to adopt business models that differ
significantly from the traditional partnership model referenced i n
Justice Powell's concurrence.38 Modem law firms may select from

that the firm functioned like a partnership and therefore Hyland, the plaintiff, should be
considered a partner, not an employee. Id. at 795. The court rejected the defendant's argu
ment and held that "the use of the corporate form" distinguished the corporation from a
partnership, and, as a result, Hyland should not be considered a partner. Id. The Hyland
court explained that "(i)t is generally accepted that the benefits of the antidiscrimination
statutes . . . do not extend to those who properly are classified as partners," but "those who
own shares in a corporation may or may not be employees." Id. at 797-98. But see id. at 799
(Cardamore, J., dissenting) ("(T]he status of the entity Hyland was associated with and his
status within that entity must be analyzed in order to determine whether he was an employee
covered by the ADEA.").
33. See, e.g., Serapion, 119 F.3d at 987-92; Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th
Cir. 1996). Aimed at determining a party's real rather than nominal level of ownership and
control within a firm, the economic realities test offers an evolved understanding of the
common law agency test. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 32324 (1992), the Supreme Court employed a test derived from the general common law agency
principles, juxtaposing the classic characteristics of a common law master-servant relation
ship to the interaction of an independent contractor and his contractual employer. Id. (con
sidering, among several other factors, the party's ability to control "the manner and means
by which the product [of the hired party's labor] is accomplished . . . the source of the in
strumentalities and tools (of the hired party's labor] . . . the duration of the relationship be
tween the parties . . . the method of payment; (and} the hired party's role in hiring and pay
ing assistants" (citation omitted)); see also Leigh Pokora, Comment, Partners as Employees
Under Title VII: The Saga Continues a Comment on the State of the Law, 22 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 249 (1995) (offering an explanation of the development of the test applied to the part
ner-employee inquiry).
34. See, e.g., Simpson, 100 F.3d at 444; Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398
(11th Cir. 1991); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 268 (10th Cir. 1987).
35. See, e.g., Simpson, 100 F.3d at 444; Fountain, 925 F.2d at 1400; Wheeler, 825 F.2d at
267-69.
36. Wheeler. 825 F.2d at 269.
37. See infra note 50.
38. See infra Part I.
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numerous forms of business organization, such as general or limited
liability partnerships, limited liability companies, or professional cor
porations.39 Depending on a law firm's choice of business form, the
management structure may include directors, presidents and vice
presidents, shareholders, or managers.40 Examination of the differ
ences between the traditional law firm partnerships referenced in the
Hishon concurrence and contemporary law firms raise doubts about
the soundness of Justice Powell's assertion that partners are not
among those Congress intended Title VII to protect.
This Note argues that the Court should interpret the term em
ployee in Title VII to include partners and similarly situated execu
tives. Noting that the Hishon concurrence has had a significant influence on the standards lower courts have adopted to evaluate the
partner-employee question, Part I deconstructs Justice Powell's con
currence and identifies the mistaken assumptions in his reasoning.
This Part explores the notable structural changes that have occurred in
the modern law firm's nature and demographics and the available
business organization forms. Part II contends that lower courts have
relied on the reasoning articulated in Justice Powell's concurrence or
some similarly flawed rationale and, as a result, the standards devel
oped to determine who qualifies as an employee fail to offer a viable
solution to the debate. Part III argues that interpreting the definition
of employee in Title VII to include partners and similarly situated
executives would satisfy the congressional purpose underlying the
statute and offer a clear resolution to the debate, allowing litigants to
predict with greater accuracy their coverage or exposure under the
law.
I.

DARWINIAN ADAPTATIONS: DEVELOPMENTS IN STRUCTURAL
ORGANIZATION AND BUSINESS FORMS

While at one time the term "vulnerable partner" seemed like an
oxymoron, recent organizational changes within law firms have altered
leadership and ownership structures increasing the possibility that one
can attain the status of partner and remain susceptible to the harms of
employment discrimination. This Part contends that arguments deny
ing law firm partners the ability to bring Title VII suits against their
firms rest on fundamentally flawed assumptions. Section I.A examines
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon v. King & Spalding. This
Section argues that the structure of law firms deviates significantly
from the firms envisioned in Justice Powell's concurrence, undermin
ing his rationale for refusing to extend Title VII coverage to include

39. See infra Part I.

40. See i11fra Part I.

·
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law firm partners. Section I.B presents the Equal Employment Oppor
tunity Commission's current investigation of the law firm partnership
of Sidley, Austin, B rown & Wood as an illustration of the complexity
of modem law firm partnerships, their management structures, and the
relationships among partners.
A.

Mistaken Assumptions: Comparing Modern Law Firms with
Traditional Partnerships

Justice Powell's terse concurrence in Hishon marked the first
opinion by a member of the Court to posit a solution to the partner
employee question.41 While the cause of action in Hishon did not
address the question of whether a partner could claim employee
status, Justice Powell recognized that lower courts might apply Hishon
by analogy to suits brought by a partner alleging that a fellow partner

or the partnership discriminated against her.42 Justice Powell suggested
that Title VII should not be interpreted to reach partners because the
interaction between partners could not be characterized as an em
ployment relationship.43 Law firms should be immune from Title VII
suits brought by partners, Justice Powell reasoned, because of the
uniqueness of the partnership structure.44 Justice Powell's opinion
relied on the assumption that each partner owns a significant share of
the business and that each participates in a decisionmaking process
based on common agreement.45 Justice Powell's concurrence explained

41. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
42. As stated above, Hishon involved an associate's claim that the law firm King &
Spalding discriminated against her because of her sex in deciding not to promote her to part
ner. Id. at 71.
43. Id. at 79. Justice Powell stated in his concurring opinion:
I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's opinion should not be read as
extending Title VII to the management of a law firm by its partners. The reasoning of
the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among partners be charac
terized as an "employment" relationship to which Title VII would apply. The relation
ship among law partners differs markedly from that between employer and employee
- including that between the partnership and its associates.

Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 80. According to Justice Powell's theory of law firm partnerships, "[t)he rela
tionship among law partners contemplates that decisions important to the partnership
normally will be made by common agreement . . . or consent among the partners." Id. In ad
dition, Justice Powell's concurrence assumes that there is a certain uniformity of characteris
tics among partnerships - a common prototype for partnerships. See id. at 79 n.2 ("Law
partnerships usually have many of the characteristics that I describe generally here."). The
partnership described in Justice Powell's concurrence resembles the traditional definition of
partnership in the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 ("UPA''). Compare Hishon, 467 U.S. at
80 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that in a law firm partnership, decisions concern
ing "such matters as participation in profits and other types of compensation; work assign
ments; approval of commitments in bar association, civic, or political activities; questions of
billing; acceptance of new clients; questions of conflicts of interest; retirement programs; and
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that the management structure of traditional law firm partnerships
minimizes the likelihood that any partner would lack the ability to
counter discrimination by another member of the firm.46
In generations past, lawyers agreed to form a general partnership,
contributed substantively to the firm's capital, divided the firm's
profits, and shared, jointly and severally, the costs of liability.47 Justice
Powell's concurrence reflects the presumption that law firms continue
to organize around these rudimentary principles.48 An examination of
the current state of the legal services industry, however, reveals sig
nificant changes in the organizational forms selected by law firms.49 In
recent years, state legislatures began enacting business governance
laws that permit law firms to select from a variety of business forms.50
expansion policies" are made by common agreement), with UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(e), 6
U.L.A. 213 (1914) (describing a partnership as a business form in which "(a)ll partners have
equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business"). For the purposes
of this Note, the term "traditional partnership" refers to the type of partnership referenced
in Justice Powell's concurrence, Hishon, 467 U.S. at 80, and the basic form of partnership as
defined by the UPA. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 18(e). In the years subsequent to the Hishon deci
sion and Justice Powell's concurrence, most states have replaced provisions adopted from
the UPA with provisions from the revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"). See UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 280 (Supp. 1995). In 1 996, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Limited Liability Partnership Amendments to
the UPA. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 1001-1003, 6 U.L.A. 239 (1997); see also notes 49-62 and
accompanying text.
46. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ IS(b), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914).
48. Hishon. 467 U.S. at 79.
49. For examples of states that have enacted provisions permitting law firms to organize
as limited liability partnerships, see, for example, ALA. CODE§§ 10-8A-l001 to -1109 (1999);
ALASKA STAT.§§ 32.05.405-.760 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-1101 (West
Supp. 2002); CAL. CORP. CODE§§ 16,951-16,962 (West Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 760-144 to -154 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT.§§ 34-400 to -434 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,§§
15-1001 to -1105 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2002); D.C. CODE ANN.§§ 33-1 I0.01 to -111.06 (1994
& Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 620.9001-.9 1 05 (2002); GA. CODE ANN.§§ 14-8-44 to -64
( 1 994 & Supp. 2002); HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 425-151 to -191 (2001); 805 lLL. COMP. STAT.
205/8.1 -8.5 (2000); IND. CODE §§ 23-4-1-44 to -52 (1998); IOWA CODE ANN.§§ 486A.1001. 1105 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 56-345 to -347 (1994 & Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN.§§ 362.555-.605 (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 9:3431-:3435 (West 1997); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,§§ 801-876 (West Supp. 2002); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS
§§ 9A-100l to - 1 1 1 1 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. l08A, §§ 45-49 (2000); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.§§ 449.44-.48 (West 2002); M.S.A.§ 323A.10-01 (West Supp. 2002-2003); MISS.
CODE ANN.§§ 79-12-87 to -119 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 358.440-.510 (West 2000); MONT.
CODE ANN.§§ 35-10-701 to -710 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 87.440-.560 (Michie 1999
& Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 42:1A-47 to -54 (West Supp. 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. 54IA-1001 to -ll05 (Michie Supp. 2002); and N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW§§ 1 21-1500 to -1503
(McKinney Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 1, § 3201 (2002). See also Carter Bishop, The
Limited Liability Partnership Amendments to the Uniform Partnership Act (1994), 53 Bus.
LAW. 101, 101 n.3 (1997).
50. While this Note focuses on limited liability partnerships, law firms may now elect to
organize under a broad array of business forms. For a description of LLCs and the benefits
available for firms organized as LLCs, see Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 559-61 (explaining
the hybrid nature - part corporation, part partnership - of LLCs and offering a theory for
the application of federal employment statutes to the members of LLCs).
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As illustrated in a number of recent cases,. Jaw firms now organize as
professional corporations ("PCs"), limited . liability companies
("LLCs"), and limited liability partnerships ("LLPs").51
1.

Law Firms Choose from a Variety of Business Forms

The LLP business form is one of the more popular organizational
models state legislatures have made available to law firms in recent
years.52 LLPs represent a hybrid between the traditional partnership
model and the corporate business model.53 Taxation benefits and pro
tection against personal liability represent two particularly distinct
characteristics of the LLP business form.54 While LLPs distribute
profits among the owners of the firm in a manner similar to the
corporate profit-sharing distribution scheme,55 LLPs receive the bene
ficial tax treatment made available to traditional partnerships but

51. For examples of state statutes permitting alternatives to traditional partnerships, see
supra note 49.
52. See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Prese/l/ at the
Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1995) ("The LLP has proved to be excep
tionally popular wherever it has been enacted. In Texas, for example, more than 1200 law
firms, including virtually all of the state's largest firms, elected to become LLPs within one
year after its enactment.").
53. LLPs offer an excellent point of departure for comparing the characteristics of the
traditional Jaw firm partnerships referenced in Justice Powell's concurrence and those most
likely to describe modern firms. LLPs maintain many of the elements of a general partner
ship while shielding partners from one of the most unattractive elements of general partner
ships - full personal liability. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-306(a) (Michie Supp.
2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 9:3431(A) (West 1995); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(2)
(McKinney 1995); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6 132b-3.08(d) (Vernon 1995). In most
states, law firms can adopt the LLP form merely by amending their partnership agreements
to reflect the organizational change and complying with state insurance coverage require
ments. The language of state statutes codifying the LLP form of business organization differs
from state to state; however, the underlying requirements for and benefits obtained from
electing this form of business organization are fairly similar. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 15-1001 (Michie Supp. 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 9:3431(A) (West 1995); N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(2) (McKinney 1995); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b3.08(d) (Vernon 1995). State regulations regarding LLPs may require law firlT\S operating as
limited liability partnerships to carry a minimum amount of insurance. coverage in order to
maintain LLP status. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1544, 1546(a) (Michie 1999) (re
quiring firms to maintain a minimum of $1,000,000 in liability insurance for each kind of lim
ited liability); TEX REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(d) (Vernon 1 995) (requiring
$100,000 in liability insurance for the kind of liability considered limited according to the
partnership agreement).
.

·

54. Unlike corporate firms that are taxed twice - once at the corporate level and again
when profits are distributed to shareholders - firms organized as LLPs are taxed only once
in accordance with each partner's earnings. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-1208 (Michie
Supp. 2002); N.Y. TAX LAW § 617 (McKinney Supp. 1999); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b-3.08(d) (West Supp. 2003).
55. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 54.
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denied to corporations.56 LLPs do not face the burden of double
taxation associated with corporate earnings.57
The liability structure of LLPs also exempts partners from the most
detrimental characteristic of traditional partnerships - unlimited
liability.58 The LLP form effectively shields partners' personal assets
from verdicts against the law firm.59 Under the traditional partnership
theory referenced in Justice Powell's concurrence, lawyers joined
together to benefit from the economies of scale created by a pool of
labor, but each was burdened by the potential threat of personal
liability for the debts of the partnership.60 Under the LLP business
model, partners obtain the most valuable benefits of the partnership

56. In accordance with the principles of pass-through taxation, partners are only taxed
individually according to their earnings. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,§ 15-1208 (Michie
2002); N.Y. TAX LAW§ 617 (McKinney Supp. 1999); TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b3.08(d) (West Supp. 2003). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly increased the popular
ity of limited liability firms by eliminating the dual tax structure applied to incorporated
businesses. The double-taxation structure involves taxing the income of the corporation and
the dividends distributed to individual shareholders. See WILLIAM KLEIN & JOHN C.
COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 102-03 (7th ed. 2000).
57. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 54.
58. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,§ 15-306 (Michie Supp. 2002); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP
LAW§ 26(b) (McKinney Supp. 2002).

59. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 58;see also Hamilton, supra note 52, at 1067.
A basic principle of general partnership law is that each individual partner is person
ally liable for all partnership obligations to the extent they exceed the assets of the
partnership. This means not only that innocent partners may be required to discharge
partnership obligations from their personal assets, but also they may be required to
make contributions from their personal assets to the partnership to enable it to dis
charge all of its liabilities.

Id.
60. The traditional partnership referenced in Justice Powell's concurrence is based on
the aggregate theory of partnership, a model that treats the partners and the partnership as a
single unit because of the shared liability and the automatic dissolution that results if one
partner leaves the firm. See supm notes 45-46 and accompanying text; see also UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT§ 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914 Supp. 1994) ("The partnership must indemnify every part
ner in respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the
ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its business or prop
erty."). Arguably the entity theory, a model that presumes partners are individuals, separate,
and distinct from the firm as an institution, would better characterize modern firms. See
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 601, 6 U.L.A. 280 (Supp. 1994) (substituting the term disassociation for
dissolution and implying that the withdrawal of a general partner does not require the
dissolution of the partnership); see also Randall J. Gingiss, Partners a.1· Common Law Em
ployees, 28 IND. L. REV. 21, 21-22, 25-36 (1994) (discussing how "[t}he [Revised Uniform
Partnership Act], which explicitly endorses the entity theory, upsets the conclusions that are
based on the aggregate theory of the [Uniform Partnership Act]"). In fact, relying on the
entity theory of partnership, one commentator proposes that the United States adopt the
United Kingdom model, which affords the same protection to partners and non-partners
claiming to be victims of sex or racial discrimination. See id. (citing the Sex Discrimination
Act, 1975, c. 65,§ 11 (Eng.); Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74,§ 10 (Eng.)). According to the
Comment to the RUPA, a partner can and should be able to bring discrimination claims
against a partnership. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr§ 4 05 405 cmt. 2, 6 U.L.A. 280 (Supp. 1994).
,
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form without exposure to the costs associated with other partners'
negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct.61
A comparison of the structure of the LLP model and the structure
of the traditional partnership model that Justice Powell referred to in
Hishon reveals notable distinctions. Justice Powell reasoned that
"relationship[s] among law partners differ[ed] markedly from that be
tween employer and employee," because partners in traditional part
nerships agreed to joint risk-exposure of their personal assets.62 In law
firms organized as LLPs, however, the partners face neither the exten
sive debt obligations nor the threat of dissolution if an individual part
ner exits the firm.63 The partners are not concerned about the effects
of firm debts on their personal financial assets - as the firm's liabili
ties no longer reach personal wealth.64 Moreover, the LLP model,
unlike the traditional partnership model, does not presume an invita
tion to join the partnership guarantees one a tenured position in the
firm. Under the revised Uniform Partnership Act, one partner's exit
does not impact the firm's continued existence.65 As a result, firms
operating as LLPs are no longer forced to dissolve if an individual
partner leaves the firm. Partners practicing law in modern firms may
be subject to termination66 - a disfavored option very rarely invoked
to resolve disputes among partners in a traditional partnership.
2.

Changes in the Internal Hierarchy of the Firm

The traditional law firm partnership model developed during the
early twentieth century. In the 1900s, elite law firms began to adopt
the internal structure and promotion system associated with the New
York firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore.67 These firms, organized
61. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 405, 405 cmt.2.
62. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
63. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
66. For an illustration of a law firm adopting a business model and drafting a partnership
agreement that permits the demotion and termination of partners, see infra notes 108-116
and accompanying text. Partners in large, elite firms may remain in competition with their
colleagues after promotion to partner and may be subject to reprimand for failure to meet
the demands that accompany promotion. See David B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A
Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL
ETHICS 15, 15-16 (1999) (arguing that "[i]n today's competitive environment partnership is
no longer the equivalent of tenure"); Wendell Lagrand, Getting There, Staying There, A.B.A.
J., Feb. 1999, at 54 (discussing the potential for partners to be removed).
67. In the early twentieth century, Paul Cravath began to promote the practice of hiring
men with the most impressive academic credentials from Columbia and Harvard and train
ing them for promotion to partnership. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY,
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 9-11 (1991)
[hereinafter TOURNAMENT) . This system became widely known as the "Cravath System."
Scholars believe Paul Cravath's experience during his clerkship and his tenure as a partner in
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almost exclusively as general partnerships, maintained a small number
of partners who managed the firm and solicited business, and recruited
a large staff of associates from the most selective law schools in the
nation.68 Each year, the partnership invited a handful of the most
respected senior associates to join their ranks at the zenith of the pro
fession.69 Senior associates who failed to receive an invitation to join
the firm as a partner were expected to resign.70 The race to the top,
often referred to as the promotion-to-partner tournament,71 proved a
successful business model for firms.72 The model allowed law firms to
minimize the prohibitive information and agency costs of monitoring
the productivity of individual associates.73 Associates' compensation
included both a nominal reward in the form of salary and a chance to
compete against fellow associates for an invitation to join the partner
ship.
The internal structure of many contemporary law firms differs
markedly from the organizational hierarchy in the traditional partner
ship referenced in Justice Powell's concurrence. Pressure from within
the domestic labor market has driven firms to increase associate
salaries and to expand the size of the firm.74 According to one com
mentator:

the offices of his mentor Walter S. Carter inspired the creation of the "Cravath system." Id.
Professors Galanter and Palay view the system as the origin of the modern day tournament
of associates competing for partnership within elite law firms. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 26-32.
70. Id at 9.
71. Id.
72. Applying the promotion-to-partner tournament theory. law firms rewarded associ
ates based on the relative value of their work performance compared to that of their peers.
TOURNAMENT, supra note 67, at 10. Under the Cravath system, supervising partners
evaluated associates on their relative ability to generate a large volume of high-quality work
product. Id.
73. Id. at 23. Transaction costs rise when partners shirk. Id. Individual partners have
"substantial incentives to renege on their obligations [to work]" and free ride on the profits
generated by the partnership. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the
Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners
Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 321 (1985) [hereinafter Gilson & Mnookin, Human
Capitalists]. Commentators note that firms incur greater info rmation costs when they must
monit9r self-interested behavior and gather data on the performance of each partner. Id.
Total agency costs rise when the methods for obtaining information become more expensive,
either because there are persons being monitored or because the persons being monitored
are no longer concentrated in a single geographic location. See Devin Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2000) ("[E]xerting day-to-day
control over employees' actions is too expensive [and] counter-productive for the em
ployer.").
74. Michael Goldhaber, Biggest Firms in the Nation Fare the Best, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30,
2000, at 1 (2000).
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[b]etween 1980 and 1988 the number of law firms with more than 100
lawyers grew by 196%, the number of firms with 51-100 lawyers grew by
91 %, and the number of firms with 21-50 lawyers grew by 68%. In con
trast the number of law firms overall increased by 1 1 % . . . From the
period 1980 to 1988 alone1 the number of lawyers in law firms with more
than fifty attorneys more than doubled, from some 27,018 to some
75,912.75
Exponential growth in the number of students entering law school and
the resulting rise in the number of associates in the labor market
forced law firms to reevaluate traditional organizational systems.76 As
a consequence, firms have adapted the tournament to meet their
changing needs.77 These adaptations increased the incremental
rewards along the track to partnership, ultimately lengthened the track
to partnership, and made the position more difficult to attain.78
Firms responded to the larger associate classes by creating addi
tional steps in the career path to partnership.79 Under the up-or-out
strategy of the tournament theory employed by traditional law firms,

75. Robert Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a
Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 354-73 (1994)
(citing Barbara A. Curran & Clara N. Carson, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE
U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1 988, at 12 (Supp. 1 991)). The changes in the legal profession
are, in part, the result of changes in the national economy. According to Nelson, the influ
ence of international trade and the shift from production industries to service industries
following World War II resulted in two major changes in the legal profession: " l ) substan
tially increased rates of growth by corporate law firms and corporate legal departments, and
2) the significant restructuring of the market for corporate legal services." Id. at 354.
76. Id. at 368.
77. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate
Law Firm: The Economics of A ssociate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 ( 1 989)
[hereinafter Gilson & Mnookin, Coming of Age].
78. See id. at 587-92; see also David B. Wilkins & G . .Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the
Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor
Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1 587 (1998) (explaining that, due to the
changes in the partnership track and the increased volume of associates reducing the
likelihood that one will make partner, many associates are no longer participating in the
tournament, but rather, perceive their experience at the firm as a temporary opportunity to
obtain highly-coveted training). According to commentators Wilkins and Gulati, associates
have a declining interest in competing in the tournament. See id. They offer the following
observations as points of departure for their analysis:
1 ) Many associates are not competing in the tournament; 2) firms do not give every
associate an equal chance of winning; 3) the interests of individual partners diverge
from those of the firm [permitting individual partner's personal interest in the suc
cess of a particular associate to carry greater weight in the decision to promote than
the associate's actual contribution to the firm]; 4) the tournament is not divided into
two (and only two) distinct stages; 5) partnership is not awarded as a reward for past
performance; and 6) firms do not seek to make the tournament's rules and
outcomes transparent lo associates.
Id.
79. See Gilson & Mnookin, Coming of Age, supra note 77, at 567 (explaining how elite
partnerships evolved "from a structure in which there were only two categories of lawyer partner and associate").
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after the appropriate period of apprenticeship the firm either invited
an associate to join the partnership or suggested she pursue other
career options.80 Today, law firms recognize the value of maintaining a
small pool of highly-skilled and well-trained senior associates.81 By
creating positions such as "of counsel," "permanent associate," "spe
cial counsel," "non-equity partner," "staff lawyer," and "junior part
ner," firms have signaled their willingness to maintain a pool of very
senior associates without conveying upon them the most precious
rights associated with partnership.82 The creation of this distinct group
of senior associates marked one major change in the hierarchy within
traditional partnerships.
The stratification within the partnership itself represents another
significant difference between the traditional law firm partnerships
envisioned in Justice Powell's concurrence and modern Jaw firms.83
The management structure in these firms may include full-time and
part-time partners,84 equity and non-equity partners,85 partners that
share equally in the profits of the firm or income partners who draw

80. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 72 (1984) ("Once an associate is passed
over for partnership at [King & Spalding] . . . the associate is notified to begin seeking em
ployment elsewhere."); see also TOURNAMENT, supra note 67, at 28 ("One of the basic ele
ments of the structure of the big firm is the 'up-or-out' rule, which prescribes that after a
probationary period the young lawyer will either be admitted to the partnership or will leave
the firm.").
81. See Gilson & Mnookin, Coming of Age, supra note 77, at 576 n.26. The economic
rationale for expelling senior associates seems to contradict basic agency and economic
theory. Once an associate has completed several years at the firm. "the firm has learned
enough about the associate's abilities and attributes to use them effectively. The associate
then provides profit for the firm to the extent amounts billed and collected for the associate's
time exceed the associate's salary plus related overhead." Id. Pointing to the economic
inefficiency of the system, Gilson and Mnookin present a compelling critique of firms'
rationale for continuing to rely on the up-or-out system. Id. at 572-74.
82. See Mary Ann Galante, Firms Look Closer at How to Create Lawyer Categories:
Permanent A ssociate, Salariec/ Partner Ideas Support and Ire, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 22, 1 983,
at I; Stephen A. Glasser, Firm Explores New Partnership Cuiegory, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1 4,
1983, at 12; Deborah Graham, New "Senior A ttorney" Program Draws A ttention at Davis
Polk, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 28, 1 983, at 3; Kirk Hallam, Big Firms Search for Alternatives to
Trculirional Form: Specialty Partners Receive Promotions But Not Partnerships, L.A.
DAILY J., Mar. 1 8, 1983, at 1; H. Edward Wesemann, The Nonequity Tier: Firms May Create
Long- Term Problems By Putting People in 'Limbo, ' " LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at 40.
83. As mentioned above, a law firm may choose a business model different from the
partnership model, and thus, the management structure could involve lawyers bearing titles
such as director, president, or shareholder. See supra Part l.A.l.
84. In effort to accommodate alternative lifestyles and the diverse needs of modern pro
fessionals, many law firms created opportunities for part-time partners. See Patricia Barnes,
From Outsider to Insider: More Firms are Appointing Women Managing Partners, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1996, at 24.
85. See Wilkins, supra note 66, at 16 (noting the difference between equity and non
equity partners). The equity partners generally receive a portion of the profits generated
from their contribution to the firm's business while non-equity partners "like associates, con
tinue to be paid a salary." Id.
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salaries and receive bonuses,86 partners with the power to vote on sig
nificant issues and partners who lack the authority to vote on those
same issues.87 Much like the changes in the associate ranks, these struc
tural changes permit the firm to adopt a diverse array of compensation
policies and to exercise greater selectivity in admitting individuals into
the highest ranks of the firm.
Modem trends indicate that firms now distribute wealth among
partners based on each partner's marginal productivity.88 During the
1970s and 1980s, many firms eliminated traditional lock-step compen
sation methods and adopted compensation methods based on the
partner's contribution to the overall profits of the firm.89 Firms have
substituted the traditional policies of profit-sharing based on principles
of equity for policies based on an "eat what you kill" principle.90
Profit-based compensation for partners creates a quasi-tournament
within the ranks of elite law firm partnerships.91 With the increasing
86. Id.
87. See Geri S. Krauss, Partnership Roles Vary Widely From Firm to Firm, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 27, 2003, at S7 (describing the different types of partners that may exist within a single
firm and the varying financial contributions and roles in management associated with these
categories). The management structure of the law firm of Sidley, Austin, Brown and Wood
("Sidley") offers an example of a modern law firm partnership in which partners' participa
tion in the decisionmaking process is limited. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood,
315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002). The partners at Sidley do not exercise the authority to set com
pensation, to vote members out of the partnership, or to select members of the powerful ex
ecutive committee that makes such important decisions. Id. at 699. For a more detailed dis
cussion of the management structure of Sidley, see infra Part l.B.
88. See Gilson & Mnookin, Human Capitalists, supra note 73, at 321 (identifying three
impediments to the traditional compensation model in large law firm partnerships as
"shirking, a partner's failure to do his 'fair share' of the work; grabbing, a partner's extrac
tion of a larger than previously agreed share of firm profits by threatening to depart; and
leaving, a partner's departure from the firm with clients and business in tow"); see also
Glasser, supra note 82, at 12; Graham, supra note 82, at 3.
89. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, Human Capitalists, supra note 73, at 341. Partners suc
cessful at attracting new clients to the firm and continuing to develop new relationships with
existing clients are referred to as "rainmakers." Rita Jensen, The Rainmakers. NAT'L L.J..
Oct. 5, 1 987, at 1 .
90. See TOURNAMENT, supra note 67, a t 5 2 (citation omitted); see also Gilson &
Mnookin, Human Capitalists, supra note 73, at 346-47. Much like the promotion-to-partner
tournament occurring among associates, the stratification of the partnership improves effi
ciency within the partnership by creating incentives for partners to compete to increase the
firm's clientele or attract new business opportunities from existing clients. See Ken
H ildebrant, Capitalism for Lawyers: It Takes More than a Brain to Keep a Firm A float, N.Y.
L.J. Sept. 1 9. 2000, at 5 ; see also Wilkins, supra note 66, at 16; Wendell Lagrand. Getting
There, Staying There, A.B.A. J .. Feb. 1 999, at 54.
91. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1 61 6.
Further, in addition to fighting to retain their hard-earned partnership positions, part
ners also compete to move up within the hierarchy of partners. This competition be
tween partners is most visible where people compete for positions on the committees
(executive, management, compensation. etc.) that manage the key business decisions at
large firms. As such, individual partners are likely to have interests that are at least in
tension, and potentially at odds with the interests of the firm as a whole.
Id. (citation omitted).
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use of contribution-based compensation and the growing number of
partners, larger firms began to construct internal decisionmaking
structures in which an individual partner's role in management or
seniority in the firm correlates to that partner's financial prominence
in the firm.92
Many corporate law firm partnerships are no longer the small,
closely-held businesses Justice Powell referred to in his concurrence.93
Partners within a particular law firm are not as geographically concen
trated as in the past. In response to the globalization of the economy,
law firms have expanded, opening offices across the nation and around
the world.94 As cross-border transactions and litigation become more
commonplace, law firms compete to provide for clients' global busi
ness needs.95
By identifying attractive merger candidates with specialized prac
tice areas and an established client base, many firms have used the
merger process to develop expertise in a new market.96 Firms have

92. See H ildebrant, supra note 90, at 5; see also Wilkins, supra note 66, at 16 (stating that
"(p]artners who make the biggest contribution to the bottom line and, therefore, receive the
largest slice of firm profits, also tend to have significant influence over firm management.").
93. In Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 445-46 (6th Cir. 1996) (Daughtrey, J.,
concurring), the concurrence emphasized the change in partnership structure:
In an era of small, closely-operated partnerships, it may have been logical to conclude
that an employer/partner could not and would not discriminate in employment deci
sions against himself or herself or against a close friend and business associate. In a
world-wide organization like Ernst & Young that employs almost 2200 "partners,"
however, the nominal co-owners of the company are, by necessity, so far removed from
the seat of actual power as to be subject to the reach of the invidious acts that em
ployment discrimination statutes seek to remedy.
Id. at 445-46.
94. MARK STEVENS, POWER OF ATTORNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT LAW FIRMS 1 4
(1987). B y merging, firms strengthen the breadth and depth o f services they can offer clients.
Several mergers with New York and Washington, D.C. firms allow for increased participa
tion in global activity. See, e.g., Bruce Balestier, A tlanta's Alston & Bird Merges with Walter
Conston, N.Y. L.J., January 9, 2001 , at 1 ; see also Goldhaber, supra note 74, at l ; Anthony
Lin, Sonnenschein Plans to Acquire RubinBaum, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 2002 at I (hereinafter
Sonnenschein] (discussing the merger of Chicago's Sonnenschien Nath & Rosenthal with
New York's RubinBaum and the merger of Chicago's Sidley & Austin with New York's
Brown & Wood).
95. See, e.g., Jones Day to Acquire Gou/dens of Britain, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003. at B4
(discussing American law firm Jones Day's announcement to acquire the United Kingdom
law firm Goulden, and, therefore, become the world's sixth largest law firm). The United
Kingdom law firm of Clifford Chance's union with New York's Roger & Wells, Germany's
Puender Volhard Weber & Axster merger with I taly's Grimaldi e Associati present addi
tional examples of global firms created through the merger process. Konstantin Richter,
Clifford Chance Votes to Merge with Grimaldi, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2000, at A25.
96. See, e.g., Anthony Lin, California Law Firms Want Bite of the Big Apple: New York
is Crucial to Growth Strategies, N.Y. L.J., May 28, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Lin, California Law
Firms]; see also STEVENS, supra note 94, at 13 (describing how Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Aom opened an office in Los Angeles to capture a greater market share of the
West Coast mergers and acquisitions business). Firms seeking to merge may select a poten
tial target based on the target's specialization in an area of law, such as antitrust securities, or
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increased their business opportunities by merging with identified tar
gets or opening offices in different parts of the country and throughout
the world.97 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, mid-sized firms began to
disappear.98 The rapid consolidation of the legal market can be charac
terized as Darwinian. 99
Several courts have followed Justice Powell's rationale withoui
giving proper consideration to the relative power held by the partner
alleging a violation of Title VII and, therefore, have unfairly disadvan
taged parties susceptible to discrimination. In defining who qualifies as
an employee for the purposes of Title VII, the Court must consider the
varying levels of power partners exercise in modern firms and permit
partners to fall within the definition of employee. An examination of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") inves
tigation of discrimination claims made by partners of the law firm Si
dley, Austin, Brown & Wood ("Sidley") illustrates the internal and ex
ternal structural changes discussed above and explains how the impact
of these changes undermines Powell's rationale for privileging part
nerships accused of violating Title VII.
B.

The Complexity of the Partner-Employee Debate i n the Modern
Law Firm

In 1999, Sidley demoted thirty-two equity partners to the position
of "counsel. "100 In response to claims that the adverse employment
actions were motivated by consideration of an impermissible charac- .
teristic, the EEOC initiated an investigation of the firm's demotion
decisions.101 Upon Sidley's refusal to cooperate, the EEOC petitioned
a federal district court j udge to issue a subpoena deuces tecum to or
der the firm to release documentation regarding the partners' poten
tial status as employees.102 Sidley argued that the demoted parties were
intellectual property. The acquired firm enhances the depth of its services by bringing teams
of attorneys with significant experience and a client base in these specialized areas.
97. Goldhaber, supra note 74; Sonnenschein, supra note 94 (describing Chicago firms'
efforts to merge with various New York firms); see also STEVENS, supra note 94. at 1 60-65
(describing Baker & McKenzie's rise as an international law firm with offices in South
America, Europe, Mexico, Canada, Asia and Australia).
98. See Amy Dockser, Midsize Law Firms Struggle to Survive, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1 9,
1988, at Bl.
99. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747. 748 ( 1 990). ln this ar
ticle, Galanter and Palay argue that growth is inherent in the structure of law firms. Id. at
755. The article posits that the internal structure, partners, and associates, who are incipient
partners, interact in a manner that forces firms onto a trajectory in which growth is "inevita
ble." Id. at 755-56 n.32.
1 00. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 3 1 5 F.3d 696. 698 (7th Cir. 2002).
1 01 . Id. at 699.
102. Id. at 700.

1086

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:1067

"real," meaning bona fide, partners and their demotions resulted from
poor job perforrnance. 103 To support its argument that the parties were
partners and not employees, Sidley presented evidence that the former
partners had contributed to the firm's capital structure; each partner
had a capital account with the firm averaging about $400,000. 104 In
addition, the parties were liable for the firm's debt in proportion to
their capital investment. 105 The factors underlying the demotion deci
sions were irrelevant, Sidley argued, because the parties' status as
former partners rendered them ineligible to claim employee status and
prevented them from invoking the protection of antidiscrimination
laws.106
Like many of the modem firms discussed above, Sidley has
changed significantly. The firm is no longer the small partnership
founded in 1866 by lawyers with a shared financial vision and similar
ethical and professional values. 107 The firm's recent merger with
Brown & Wood increased the total number of partners to more than
500. 108 A self-perpetuating executive committee comprised of thirty-six
partners basically controls the firm.109 The executive committee is
described as self-perpetuating because only those partners on the
executive committee can appoint future members to the committee. 1 10
The members of the partnership have "no control, direct or indirect,
over [the executive committee's] composition." 1 1 1 The committee
delegates some power to subordinate committees that make decisions
regarding the hiring, firing, and compensation of associates.1 12 The
executive committee controls partner appointments to those subordi
nate committees and ultimately checks the subordinate committees'
decisions. 1 13 The executive committee has the power to promote part
ners, to demote partners, and to alter their compensation. 1 14 The com
mittee determines partners' salaries based on a percentage point scale
set according to the firm's overall profits . 1 1 5 The merger with Brown &
1 03. ld. at 699.
104. ld.
LOS. ld.
1 06. Id.
107. See, e.g., Sidley. Austin, Brown & Wood website, at http://www.sidley.com/
about/about.asp (last visited Mar. 2. 2003).
108. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 702.
1 09. Id. at 699.
1 1 0. ld.
11 1 . lei. at 703.
1 12. lei. at 699.
113. Id.
1 14. Id.
1 15. lei.
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Wood is the only firm-wide issue on which all partners have voted in
the last twenty-five years, and that vote took place after the EEOC
began its investigation. 1 1 6 Thus, the real power in the firm is concen
trated in the hands of the executive committee.1 1 7
When lawyers agree t o create a law firm and organize the business
as a general partnership, Justice Powell reasoned, there is an implicit
understanding that decisions regarding division of profits, assignments,
participation in civic and political activities, acceptance of new clients,
retirement programs, and expansion policies will be made by common
agreement. 1 1 8 Implicitly, Justice Powell's rationale suggests that part
ners do not require the protection of antidiscrimination legislation be
cause partners have access to tools that enable them to dismantle dis
crimination levied against them. The Sidley example illustrates the
incongruity between Justice Powell's assumptions about the structure
of partnerships and the nature of relations among partners.
Justice Powell indicates that a firm's choice to adopt a decisionmaking
structure based on common agreement signals the egalitarian nature
of partnerships and each partner's ability to impact policies or deci
sions she opposes.
According to the record of the EEOC investigation, Sidley part
ners did not make decisions by common agreement.1 19 Rather, the
firm, relied on the two-tiered committee structure in which the execu
tive committee made all of the most important decisions without con
sulting the general members of the partnership.120 At the time the
EEOC investigation commenced, Sidley had over 1400 lawyers work
ing in offices in thirteen different cities, including London, Hong
Kong, Tokyo, Beijing, and Shanghai.121 The appellate court reviewing
the EEOC's petition declared that the thirty-two demoted partners
"were defenseless" and that the allocation of power conceding all
authority to the executive committee left the partners with "no power
over their fate" within the firm.122

1 1 6. Id.

1 17. Id.
1 18. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
1 19. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 703.
1 20. Id.
121. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood website, at http://www.sidley.com/offices/
offices.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) (The firm, "one of the largest in the United States," has
"about 1400 lawyers practicing on three continents.").
122. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Galanter & Palay, supra note 99, at 755-56 ("Informality recedes, collegiality gives way,
notions of public service and independence are marginalized, and the imperative of growth
collides with notions of dignified passivity in obtaining business."). According to one appel
late court reviewing the question of partners as employees, big partnerships are like corpora
tions: "Wall Street law firms . . . are often large, impersonal, highly structured enterprises of
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Despite the fact that Sidley maintains the exact business form re
ferred to in his concurrence, one can easily distinguish Sidley from the
closely-held business Justice Powell describes. As demonstrated by the
demotions in Sidley, in a modern law firm, all persons bearing the title
"partner" may not participate in the most fundamental decisions re
garding the firm and the conditions of their employment. Contrary to
Justice Powell's assumptions, the partnership agreement creating the
firm may explicitly authorize a particular group or committee to select
candidates for promotion and to terminate partners without the
consent of general members of the partnership.123 The Sidley investiga
tion illustrates the potential for hierarchy among partners in the firm
and the diverse levels of power that a firm may delegate to partners.124
After an examination of the facts underlying the EEOC investigation,
permitting modern firms to benefit from the special privileges
accorded traditional law firm partnerships seems perverse. Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon must be read in the context of
the burgeoning antidiscrimination jurisprudence, and the Court's sub
sequent suspicion (and later, outright rejection) of the argument that
partnerships are sacred and beyond the ambit of antidiscrimination
law.125 By failing to recognize fundamental changes in the nature and
organization of law firms as businesses, courts allow law firms to evade
the antidiscrimination requirements of Title VII. Law firm partner-

essentially perpetual duration." Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 268 (10th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Bellis v. United States, 4 1 7 U.S. 85, 93-94, ( 1 974)).
1 23. Law firm partnerships are generally fo rmed by the signing of a partnership agree
ment. The terms of.the partnership agreement can invest in a particular group or committee
the power to dismiss partners. See Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336,
341 ( 1 9%) (citing to the firm's 1 992 Partnership Agreement which stated that "the firm's
Executive Committee 'shall be the policy making and governing authority of the Firm'. . . . "
and shall have the power to expel partners from the firm). In recent years, numerous part
ners have filed suit against partnerships raising claims of improper dismissals. See, e.g.,
Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 5 1 5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1 974) (upholding a law firm's decision to
expel two partners where the partnership agreement included provisions for terminating
partners).
1 24. See supra notes 1 08-1 1 6 and accompanying text.
1 25. The majority opinion in liishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1 984), and the
plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), indicate the Court's
departure from a jurisprudence privileging partnerships based on assumptions about the re
lationships among partners. Similar to Hishon, Hopkins involved an associate's claim that
her employer, a partnership, discriminated against her in deciding not to promote her to
partner because of her sex. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1 984). Hopkins involved a well-known
accounting partnership, Price Waterhouse. Id. For the purposes of this Note, the author in
cludes discussion of large accounting partnerships because their organizational structure and
promotion processes closely mirror those of large law firm partnerships.
In both His/um and Hopkins, the Court acknowledged that partnerships use the tourna
ment model as a recruiting device to induce young associates to agree to work in a highly
strenuous professional environment for several years in exchange for consideration for
promotion on a "fair and equal" basis. See, e.g., Hishon, 467 U.S. at 74 n.6. When partner
ships make decisions based on factors that contravene antidiscrimination law, their decisions
should receive no special protection. See infra notes 191-1 94 and accompanying text.
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ships are not the small, intimate joint ventures of the past. Partners in
a law firm may exercise differing levels of authority and control, work
in different cities or on different continents, and may be vulnerable to
discriminatory acts perpetuated by other partners or the decision
making authority of the firm.
II.

TESTS DEVELOPED BY LOWER COURTS TO DETERMINE A
PARTNER'S STATUS

Lower courts have adopted either the per se test or the economic
realities test to determine whether a partner qualifies as an employee.
Part II argues that these methods reflect Justice Powell's antiquated
assumptions about the financial structure and management hierarchy
within law firms. 126 Section II.A examines the per se test and argues
that the test engenders arbitrary results. Section II.B considers the
most widely adopted mechanism for resolving the debate - the
economic realities test - and argues that this method also privileges
law firms based on misperceptions about the management structure
and financing of these firms.
A.

A pplying a Bright-Line Rule to Blurry D istinctions: The Fallacies
of the Per Se Rule D istinguishing En:iployers and Employees

In one of the earliest cases exploring the partner-employee ques
tion, Burke v. Friedman,127 the Seventh Circuit applied a per se rule
explicitly excluding partners from the statute's definition of em
ployee.128 Burke involved a female partner's allegation that the defen
dant partnership inappropriately considered her sex in the decision to
discharge her.129 The Burke court reasoned that partners do not qualify
as employees under Title VII because the empl9yment categories in-

1 26. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 1 19 F.3d 982, 986 (1 st Cir. 1997) (relying on
language from Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon); Hyland /, supra note 6, 794
F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1 986) (same).
127. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
128. Burke, 556 F.2d at 868. While Burke involved an accounting partnership, the rule
articulated in this case has been applied broadly to partners in other types of businesses. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1 1 77, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying a per se
rule to exclude attorneys who were shareholders in a law firm organized as a profe ssional
corporation, and holding that the shareholders, like partners, could not be counted as em
ployees to determine that the defendant met the statutory requirements to be considered an
employer).
129. The court did not reach the merits of Burke's claim, but rather dismissed the suit
for lack of jurisdiction. Burke, 556 F.2d at 870. According to the text of the statute, an em
ployer is not subject to liability under Title VII if the employer has less than fifteen employ
ees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). The court explored the question of Burke's· status as an
employee in order to determine whether the firm had the requisite number of employees to
qualify as an employer under Title VII . Burke, 556 F.2d at 869.
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volve mutually exclusive groups.130 One could not, the court explained,
be both a proprietor and an employee of the same business.131 The
Burke court reasoned that partners who are owners and managers of
the business and the persons who comprise the partnership could not
be considered employees.132
Other circuits have determined liability under Title VII based on
the business form selected by the defendant law firm. In Hyland v.
New Haven Radiology Associates, 133 the Second Circuit addressed the
issue of whether to extend the rule excluding partners from the defini
tion of employee to executives in businesses not organized as partner
ships.134 After explaining that the touchstone of the inquiry in Hishon
1 30. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869. Justice Powell's concurrence in Hishon reflects this same
rationale for excluding partners from the definition of employee. 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("The reasoning of the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship
among partners be characterized as an 'employment' relationship to which Title VI I would
apply. The relationship among law partners differs markedly from that between employer
and employee - including that between the partnership and its associates.").
131. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 869 (stating "we do not see how partners can be regarded as
employees rather than employers who own and manage the operation of the business"); see
also Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1 986) (reasoning that "the benefits of
antidiscrimination statutes . . . do not extend to those who are properly classified as part
ners"); see also 4 JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR .. CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
Cft21 .08[E] (noting that "[w]hile the employees of a partnership are protected by Title VII,
the partners themselves are not"). But see Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop. Inc., 366 U.S.
28, 32 (1 960) (holding that shareholders in knitwear cooperative were employees under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court explained that "[t]here is nothing inherently inconsis
tent between the coexistence of a proprietary and an employment relationship").
1 32. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 869; see also Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (10th
Cir. 1 987) (explaining that "in general the total bundle of partnership characteristics suffi
ciently differentiates between [partners and non-partners so as] to remove general partners
from the statutory term 'employee' ").
1 33. Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1 986). The plaintiff, an officer and
director in a group of medical doctors organized as a professional corporation, filed an
ADEA claim alleging that his forced resignation was motivated by discrimination. Hyland I,
supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1 986). Prior to the Second Circuit review, a Connecticut
District Court found the medical group "amount[ed] to a partnership in all but name," and
that Hyland was, therefore, a partner in the enterprise. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology
Assocs., 606 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Conn. 1 985) [hereinafter Hyland II]. While Hyland in
volved an ADEA claim by a medical doctor, the reasoning of the court reached law firms
organized as partnerships or as other types of business. See, e.g. , Rosenblatt v. Bivona &
Cohen, P.C., 969 F. Supp. 207, 214 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1 997) ("Because Title VII, the ADA and
the ADEA set forth identical definitions of the term 'employee,' courts generally cross
reference discussions of the standard required by the statutes."); see also supra note 19.
134. Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d at 797 ("Justice Powell's concurring opinion
expressed the view that Title VII does not cover the members of a partnership."). The
Second Circuit's recent decision in EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc. suggests that the court
intends to apply a rule less rigid than that articulated in Hyland. EEOC v. Johnson &
Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1 529, 1538 (2d Cir. 1 996). The Johnson & Higgins court paid lip service
to the economic realities test and asserted that its holding was appropriate because the direc
tor's role, as viewed through the lens of common law agency principles, was that of an em
ployee. Id. at 1 537-38. Yet, any argument that the Second Circuit has abandoned the Hyland
per se rule is easily refuted by looking to the court's own language indicating that a party's
title might be sufficient to sever the link between employee and employer. Id. at 1540 ("J &.
H can comply with the (statute] by severing the link between the individual's employee
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was the firm's decision to organize as a partnership, the Hyland court
held that the exemption only applied to partnerships and no consid
eration should be given to similarities between the defendant's
business form and the partnership business form.135 The court's hold
ing created a per se rule based on the form of the business accused of
discrimination.136 According to the Hyland court's reasoning, directors
and managers in law firms organized as professional corporations
qualify as employees for the purposes of Title VII, whereas partners
exercising similar levels of responsibility in law firms organized as
partnerships are denied employee status.137 Courts following the per se
rule adopted in Hyland, begin analysis of the partner-employee ques
tion by determining whether a "true partnership" exists.138
The per se rule fails to offer a viable solution to the partner
employee question. First, courts applying the per se rule misread
Justice Powell's concurrence in Hishon. While Justice Powell's concur
rence does suggest that partners should not be permitted to bring dis
crimination claims against general partnerships, it also warns lower
status and his director status. Once so severed, non-employee directors are not subject to the
[statute] as employees."); see also id. at 1538 ("Accordingly, Hyland remains good law, and J
& H is precluded from arguing that it is exempt from the ADEA because it is a de facto
partnership.").
135. Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 ·F.2d at 798 (holding that a firm's decision to
select the corporate business form "precludes any examination designed to determine
whether the entity is in fact a partnership" or whether the exemption should be extended to
the defendant entity); see also Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 271 F.3d 903,
905 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 31 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2002) (No. 01 -1435) (explaining
that "because the decision to incorporate is presumably a voluntary one, there is no reason
to permit a professional corporation to secure the 'best of both possible worlds' by allowing
it both to assert its corporate status in order to reap the tax and civil liability advantages and
to argue that it is like a partnership in order to avoid liability for unlawful employment dis
crimination.").
1 36. Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d at 793.
137. Id.; see also Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 969 F. Supp. 207, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1 997). The Rosenblatt court explained that "where [the] defe ndant is admittedly a profes
sional corporation of which plaintiff is a non-equity partner, [the] plaintiff is a corporate em
ployee for the purposes of Title VII." l<L at 215.
To support the distinction between law firm partners and employees, the Hyland court
cites Justice Powell's statement that " 'the relationship among law partners differs markedly
from that between employer and employee.' " Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d at 801
(quoting H ishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also
Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1532 (holding that the per se rule exempting law firm
partners from Title VII coverage does not extend to shareholders, directors, or other
managers of a corporation, without regard to the similarities between the roles of partners
and shareholders, directors, or other managers); Zimmerman v. N. Am. Signal, 704 F.2d 347,
353 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding an ADEA plaintiff, a corporate vice president and one-third
shareholder, was an employee).
138. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, 969 F. Supp. at 207, 209. The plaintiff, a former non-equity
partner, filed a claim alleging that the defendant law firm, organized as a professional
corporation, violated Title VII when the firm decided to terminate him. Id. The Rosenblatt
court held that the plaintiff was a corporate employee for Title VII purposes and permitted
the plaintiff to bring a Title VII claim because a "true partnership" did not exist. Id. at 21415.
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courts against adopting a rule that allows firms to evade liability or to
minimize exposure to the provisions of Title VII by simply calling
someone a partner.139 If courts permit titular distinctions to determine
access to the protection afforded by Title VII, firms can manipulate
the rule and discriminate without fear of reprisal.
Courts and commentators have criticized the per se rule on these
same grounds. The First Circuit, for example, criticized the use of a
per se rule, explaining that "the Title VII question cannot be decided
solely on the basis that a partnership calls - or declines to call - a
person a 'partner.' "140 Due to the increasingly complex organization
within law firm partnerships, a per se rule incorrectly frames the
partner-employee inquiry. There is nothing inherent in the title or the
position of "partner" that removes one from the potential dangers of
discrimination. In addition, law firms have adopted a range of business
forms, diminishing courts' abilities to make general assumptions about
the level of authority a partner exercises and the partner's ability to
confront a discriminatory actor within the firm.141
The structure of law firm partnerships has changed such that
multiple tiers of authority may exist within a single partnership.142 The
tiers within the ranks of a partnership may reflect a hierarchy based on
seniority or rainmaking.143 As the Hyland court conceded, "certain
modern partnerships and corporations .are practically indistinguishable
in structure and operation.''144 One commentator explains the difficulty
of transitioning from initial entry to a senior position within the part
nership. 145 The day after an associate becomes a partner, her job title
changes, but she may still have relatively de minimis authority to affect
firm policies or to challenge a more senior partner who treats her dif
ferently on the basis of sex.146 Courts must consider the reality that

1 39. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Of course, an employer may
not evade the strictures of Title Vil simply by labeling its employees as 'partners.' ). It is
noteworthy that the Seventh Circuit has also acknowledged the dangers of exalting titular
form over the actual substance of an employment relationship. See, e.g., Zimmerman, 704
F.2d at 352 n.4 ("We caution that employers cannot avoid having employees counted toward
the jurisdictional threshold by denominating them as directors, independent contractors, or
other designations besides 'employee.' The issue is whether an employer-employee relation
ship exists, not what title a worker holds.").
"

140. Serapion v. Martinez, 1 1 9 F.3d 982, 987 (1st Cir. 1 997).
141. See supra Part I.A.
1 42. See supra Part l .A.2.
143. See supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
144. Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986).
1 45. Wilkins, supra note 66, at 16; see also supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
146. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 261 (10th Cir. 1 987) ("After being made a
partner Wheeler's work remained unchanged. She had the same client load, same duties and
responsibilities, same support staff, and was supervised in her work and work assignments,
by the same department head."); Montgomery v. Lobman, Carnahan, Batt & Angelle, 729
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partners do not possess greater authority to combat discrimination
simply because of their role as owners in the firm.147
Second, noting . that law firms now choose from a diverse array of
business organizational forms created by state agency and partnership
laws,148 courts' reliance on a per se rule that exempts certain business
forms from Title VII increases the danger that state law will unduly in
fluence the application of a federal statute.149 The determination of
who qualifies to bring suit under Title VII, a federal statute, should
not depend on the definitional principles of business forms as codified
in state law.150 Reliance on state agency and partnership laws, even if
minimal, threatens to compromise the goals of the federal statute.151
Federal law has nationwide implications that may be impaired if
state law, which may vary greatly, controls the initial inquiry of the
analysis.152
The irony of applying a per se rule to modern firms is now clear lower courts' analysis of the partner-employee question focuses on
titular distinctions and differences in business form while failing to
consider internal and external changes in the legal market that have
severely altered the relationships among partners. As illustrated in the
above discussion of Sidley, a modern firm with more than 500 partners
may choose to adopt a structure that closely resembles the corporate

So. 2d 1075, 1 079 (La. Ct.App. 1 999) (discussing plaintiff-partner's assertion that "she per
formed essentially the same duties as the associate attorneys").
147. See Wilkins, supra note 66, at 16.
1 48. See infra Part I.B discussing the changes in the business forms available to law firms
through recently enacted state partnership and corporations laws.
149. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1 997) (disregarding the defi
nition of employee under state law and finding that the term "employee" should be inter
preted to include "former as well as current employees" because excluding fomier employ
ees would threaten the term's "consistency with a primary purpose of [the] antiretaliation
provisions" of the statute); Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 1 03, 1 1 9 (1 983)
(explaining that federal laws should not be construed as to make .their application dependent
on state law). State partnership law may classify all partners as employers, but federal courts'
interpretation of the same term may differ from the state interpretation. One federal
appellate court has noted that the same nominal partner classified as an employer under
state law "might be classified as an employee for other purposes, including the purpose for
which federal antidiscrimination law extends protection to employees." EEOC v. Sidley
Austin Brown & Wood, 3 1 5 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
150. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 988 (1st Cir. 1 997) (stating as a "widely
accepted principle" the proposition that "courts ought to presume that the interpretation of
a federal statute is not dependent upon state law" (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw
I ndians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989); Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S.
103, 1 1 9 (1983); and United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1 994)).
151. For a discussion of the legislative purpose underl�ing Title VII, see infra Part I II .
152. See Jerome v . United States, 318 U.S. 101, 1 04 (1943) ("But we must generally
assume, in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, that Congress when it enacts a
statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law. That assump
tion is based on the fact that the application of federal legislation is .nationwide . . . . ").
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form, placing all power in the hands of an executive committee.153
Noting the exceptional similarities in the management responsibilities
of the directors or shareholders in corporations and partners in law
firms, such a rule seems arbitrary.154 Neither a plaintiff's title nor the
defendant's chosen form of business should be the touchstone for
resolving the employee inquiry.
B.

Closer to the Target: But Still Missing the Mark: The
Inconsistencies in the Economic Realities Test

Courts applying the economic realities test have also relied on Jus
tice Powell's concurrence.155 Additionally, these courts have found
support in the Supreme Court's analysis in Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Darden. 1 56 In response to the question of whether a
party was an independent contractor or an employee, the Darden
Court held that the issue should be resolved by measuring the party's
relationship with the alleged employer according to common law
agency principles conventionally used to assess master-servant rela
tionships.157 The Court considered several factors listed in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency158 as common law indicators of
whether the party alleging discrimination qualified as a servant or an
employee of the defendant firm.159 Following the reasoning in Darden,
lower courts adopting the economic realities test have applied com1 53. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
supra Part l.B.
1 54. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1 529, 1 537 (2d Cir. 1 99 1 ) ("[C]ertain
modem partnerships and corporations are practically indistinguishable in (their] structure
and operation.").
1 55. See, e.g., Serapion, 1 19 F.3d 982 ( l st Cir. 1997); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 1 00
F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1 996).
1 56. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). While lower courts have applied the reasoning from Darden to
partner-employee disputes, the Supreme Court has not yet held that Darden controls
partner-employee inquiries. See Serapion, 1 19 F.3d 982 ( ! st Cir. 1 997); Simpson, 100 F.3d 436
(6th Cir. 1 996). Darden is also distinguishable from the Title VII claims which are the
focus of this Note because Darden involved a dispute alleging a violation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2003). Darden, 503
U.S. at 320-21 . Courts have asserted that the same analysis should apply when determining
who qualifies as an employee under antidiscrimination statutes and ERISA because the stat
ues all contain the same circular definition of employee. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Serapion, 119 F.3d at 985 ("We regard Title VII, ADEA,
ERISA, and FLSA as standing in pari parssu and endorse the practice of treating judicial
precedents interpreting one such statute as instructive in decisions involving another.");
Hyland I, supra note 6, 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1 986) ("Since . . . [the] statutes have a
similar purpose - to stamp-out discrimination in various forms - cases construing the defi
nitional provisions of one are persuasive authority when interpreting the others.") (citations
omitted); see also supra note 1 9.
1 57. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.
1 58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) ( 1958).
1 59. Id.
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mon law agency principles to determine the proprietary and manage
ment roles of partners who allege discrimination.160
While the economic realities test offers a more probative inquiry
- questioning partners' actual relationships with their firms and
fell ow members of the firms' management - the test presents notable
concerns. Courts have misunderstood the goal of the economic reali
ties inquiry.161 In EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. ,162 for example, the
Seventh Circuit used the economic realities test to determine if the
shareholder plaintiff exercised a level of authority and invested an
amount of capital analogous to the that of a partner in a partnership.
Upon deciding that the shareholder's role in the firm was equivalent to
the role of a partner in a partnership, the court applied a per se rule
rejecting the argument that shareholders could qualify as employees.163
The court's logic is perplexing for two reasons. First, the court applied
the economic realities test solely to determine if the role of the party
claiming employee status is more or less analogous to that of a part
ner.164 This method of analysis assumes that partners are exempt from
the definition of employee without establishing the underlying
rationale for such an assumption. Such analysis only evaluates "part
ner" status, begging the question of whether a partner, in fact, can ever
be considered an employee. This analysis also assumes a universal
understanding of who falls within the "partner" classification. Second,
applying the economic realities test as a partner-litmus test frustrates
the goal of the economic realities test. Courts apply the test to ascer
tain whether the party alleging discrimination is "so dominated in or
by the organization that he or she is really like an employee, with
corollary susceptibility to discrimination."165 Using the economic reali
ties test to determine partner status fails to answer the question of
whether the subject of the inquiry was or could have been a victim of
unlawful discrimination.
Other courts have misapplied the economic realities test by focus
ing the inquiry narrowly on only one of the many elements that
indicate the existence of a master-servant relationship.166 For example,
several of these courts assume that financial contribution offers the
single most valuable proxy for determining a partner's level of con-

160. See, e.g., Serapion, 1 19 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1997); Simpson, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.
1996). For an explanation of the development of the economic realities test see Pokora,
supra note 33, at 258.
161. See EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1 177 (7th Cir. 1984).
162. Id. at 1 178.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 269 (10th Cir. 1987).
166. See, e.g., id. at 274-75.
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trol. 167 These courts rely solely on evidence of some financial invest
ment as demonstrative of a party's ability to exercise power within the
firm. 168 Yet, when discussing the financial contribution of a particular
plaintiff, these courts fail to consider the plaintiff-partner's contribu
tion relative to the contributions of her peers.169 Moreover, considering
a partner's financial contributions without analyzing its correlation to
her role in firm management offers little clarification as to the part
ner's actual power or ability to respond to discrimination. 1 70 When
firms appoint partners to management positions in a hierarchical
system, courts must determine the real or nominal authority vested in
each of these positions before making assertions regarding the reality
of any one partner's power within a firm. Courts currently applying
the economic realities test have undermined the value of the test's
analysis by relying on mere evidence that the partner exercised some
control in the firm.
Adding to the confusion surrounding the partner-employee ques
tion, courts that have adopted the economic realities test each consider
different combinations of factors when evaluating employee status and
assign a different value to the presence or absence of the evaluated
characteristics.171 In Simpson v. Ernst & Young,172 the Sixth Circuit
applied the economic realities test to the plaintiff-partner's claim and
devoted a significant portion of the inquiry to questions of financial
ownership, offering only fleeting consideration to the management
structure of the partnership accused of discrimination. 173 Upon
determining that Simpson made a miniscule financial investment that
did not constitute a bona fide ownership interest in the firm, the court
held that Simpson qualified as an employee who could bring suit
under Title Vll.174

167. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 1 19 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1 997).
1 68. See id.
1 69. See id.
170. See supra Part l.A.2.
171. Courts adopting the economic realities test have considered similar, but often dif
fe rent factors. In addition, the weight they have assigned to the factors considered in the test
vary significantly. See Serapion, 1 1 9 F.3d at 989-90; Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436,
443 (6th Cir. 1 996); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co. , 925 F.2d 1398, 1401 ( 11th Cir. 1991);
Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 269-70 (10th Cir. 1 987).
1 72. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 443-44.
173. Id. Simpson did not bring a claim under Title VII; instead, his claim involved viola
tions of the ADEA and the ERISA. The language defining "employers" and "employees" is
similarly circular and courts often cross-apply decisions on these and other antidiscrimina
tion statutes. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
174. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 443-44.
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In Serapion v. Martinez, 1 75 however, the First Circuit gave little
credence to the plaintiff-partner's argument that the court should con
sider her notably diminutive capital contribution.176 The Serapion
court reasoned that the plaintiff's position on several management
committees and the fact that she maintained some capital contribution
were sufficient to remove her from Title VII's definition of em
ployee. 1 77 While the Simpson court emphasized the differences in the
partners' financial contribution as a factor in the economic realities
test,178 the Serapion court declined to consider the disparity in the size
of the partners' capital contributions.179 As a result of the varying fac
tors applied and different values assigned to each factor, litigants and
law firms cannot accurately predict when a partner alleging discrimina
tion may have colorable claim of discrimination.180
Even proponents of the economic realities test recognize that it
does not present the ideal method of analysis for the partners who
may be vulnerable to discrimination. While joining the majority opin
ion applying the economic realities test in Simpson, Judge Daughtrey
wrote a separate concurrence urging Congress to take action to
resolve the debate.181 Judge Daughtrey recognized the need for a
uniform resolution to the partner-employee debate. 182 Part III pro175. l 1 9 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1997). In Serapion, a proprietary partner sued her partnership
for discrimination, claiming that she received a lesser equity interest and compensation
package than the named defendants (male partners) of her partnership because of her sex, in
violation of Title V I I. Serapion, 1 1 9 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1997).
1 76. Id. at 984-85.
177. Id. The first stage in the test examines the factors outlined by Darden in the
common law agency test, including investment in the firm, ownership of firm assets, and
liability for firm debts and obligations. The second stage inquires as to how the firm compen
sates the partner and the extent to which remuneration is based on the "vagaries of the
firm's economic fortunes." The third stage considers the partner's consideration in decision
making and control of the firm. Serapion, 1 1 9 F.3d at 990. The economic realities test used in
Serapion is markedly similar to the test applied by the Eight Circuit in Devine v. Stone, 100
F.3d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1 996) (holding that "[t]he actual duties and role of the individual govern
the resolution of the [question of whether or not a partner qualifies as an employee under
Title VII]").
1 78. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441 -44.
179. Serapion, 1 19 F.3d at 991-92.
1 80. See Simpson, 100 F.3d at 443-44 (examining a partner's role as owner and manager
of the firm); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1991) (analyzing a
partner's role in the operations of the firm as well as his role in management, control, and
ownership); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (10th Cir. 1 987) (finding that a partner's
status under the statute can be determined by examining the "total bundle of partnership
characteristics").
1 81. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 445 (Daughtrey, J., concurring). The concurrence explicitLy
stated that a congressional amendment would offer the best safeguard to ensure proper re
gard for the law in all employment relationships.
1 82. While Judge Daughtrey's proffered solution would resolve the debate, a congres
sional amendment is arguably unnecessary. First, the United States Supreme Court has the
authority to interpret the definition of "employee," see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), and an opportunity to resolve the question this term, see Wells v.
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poses that Congress amend Title VII and resolve the partner
employee dilemma by affirmatively including partners in the statutory
definition of employee.
III. STRUCTUR I N G A SOLUTION THAT WORKS
In developing a standard for analyzing the partner-employee ques
tion, several courts have followed Justice Powell's rationale without
giving proper consideration to the relative power held by the partner
alleging a violation of Title VII. Both the per se rule and economic
realities test unfairly disadvantage parties that may be susceptible to
discrimination. Courts should not become entangled in weighing the
varying levels of power partners exercise in modern firms, but rather
allow partners to fall within the definition of employee and hold de
fendant firms liable for unlawful acts of discrimination. As Part II
demonstrated, both the per se rule and the economic realities test fail
to provide viable solutions to the partner-employee dilemma. Given
the current inconsistency, the Court should use the opportunity pro
vided by Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, 1 83 to inter
pret the term "employee" to include partners and similarly situated
executives. This interpretation would settle disputes regarding who
falls within the purview of the statute and would avoid the gaps
created by courts trying to engineer a test that satisfies the congres
sional intent to protect vulnerable parties from the evils of employ
ment discrimination. Interpreting "employee" to include partners
would allow parties to predict their exposure to Title VII and to
conform their behavior to the law.
Generally, in determining the definitional scope of a term in a stat
ute, courts look to the legislative history for indication of the congres
sional intent.184 While at first blush the term "employee" seems easily
defined, the employment context has undergone significant changes in
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 27 1 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 1 23 S.
Ct. 31 (U.S. Oct. l, 2002) (No. 01 -1435). Justice Powell's concurrence in Hislron is not con
trolling precedent on the question of whether a partner can qualify as an employee under the
provisions of Title VII, see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1 977), as no other justices
joined his opinion and the majority opinion, which left the partner-employee question unre
solved, was unanimous. Second, as explained in Part Ill, the statute does not contain lan
guage explicitly prohibiting partners from claiming employee status or partnerships as em
ployers from suits brought by partners. See infra Part Ill. When Congress intended to
exempt a particular class of employees or employers from the statutes provisions, it did so.
See infra note 1 90 and accompanying text.
1 83. 271 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 31 (U.S. Oct. l, 2002) (No.
01 -1435)
184. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992);
McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 1 36, 139 (1991 ); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621 (1990) ("An analytical conundrum besets a court's
interpretation of a statute: The statute's text is the most important consideration in statutory
interpretation, and a clear text ought to be given effect.").
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the years since the passage of Title VII.185 Noting the complex struc
ture of relationships and the varying types of business forms available
to modern firms, determining with certainty who qualifies as an em
ployee is a difficult task.186
The legislative history of Title VII contains no discussion regarding
the definition of "employee."187 During the Senate debate, Senator
Cotton proposed the sole amendment to Title VII that addressed the
scope of the terms "employer" and "employee."188 Senator Cotton's
comment addressed the number of employees a firm must employ to
trigger application of Title VII.189 Similarly, while Title VII has explic
itly exemplified certain business entities and persons from the defini
tions of "employer" and "employee" the statute contains no language
exempting partnerships from the provisions of Title VII.190 When
Congress wanted to exempt a type of business entity, it took the
appropriate steps to create an exemption.191 The absence of such a
provision for partnerships eliminates the need to single out this par
ticular business form for an exemption.
There is, however, ample discussion of goals Congress intended to
achieve by enacting the statute.192 Title VII signaled Congress's com-

185. See supra Part l.B.l.
186. See Serapion v. Martinez. 1 1 9 F.3d 982, 987 (1st Cir. 1 997). " Partnerships," as the
Serapion court explained, "are mutable structures, and partners come in varying shapes and
sizes. Consequently, attempting to delineate the circumstances in which a particular partner
should be regarded as an employee for Title V I I purposes is tricky business." Id.
1 87. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,085 (1964); accord 118 CONG. REC. 1524 (1972); 1 18 CONG.
REC. 2391 (1972).
1 88. To gain support for an amendment that would increase the number of employe�s
required to exercise jurisdiction under Title VII, Senator Cotton argued that "when a small
businessman who employs 30 or 25 or 26 persons selects an employee, he comes very close to
selecting a partner; when a businessman selects a partner, he comes dangerously close to the
situation he faces when he selects a wife." 1 1 0 CONG. REC. 13,085; accord 1 1 8 CONG. REC.
1 524; 1 1 8 CONG. REC. 2391 .
189. 1 1 0 CONG. REC. 13,085; accord 118 CONG. REC. 1524; 118 CONG. REC. 2391 .
190. The majority in Hishon v. King & Spalding opined that there was "nothing in the
statute or the legislative history that would support such a per se exemption." 467 U.S. 69, 77
(1984).
191. The opinion also noted that when "Congress wanted to grant [a specific type of]
employer complete immunity, it expressly did so." Hishon. 467 U.S. at 77-78; see also id. at
78 n.1 1 ("For example, Congress expressly exempted Indian tribes and certain agencies of
the District of Columbia, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e (b)(l), small businesses and bona fide private
membership clubs, § 2000e(b)(2), and certain employees of religious organizations, § 2000e1 .").
1 92. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963). "The purpose of this title is to eliminate. through
the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment
'based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The title authorizes the establishment of a
Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and delegates to it the primary re
sponsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful employment practices as defined in the
title . . . . It is also declared to be a national policy to protect the right of persons to be free
from such discrimination." Id. at 26.
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mitment to eliminate the barriers that operate to prevent protected
classes from equal and fair access to all employment opportunities.193
Interpreting the term "employee" too narrowly threatens to under
mine the primary purpose of the statute.194
Including partners in the definition of "employee" is consistent
with the purpose underlying the statute - to protect all persons from
experiencing the indignities of discrimination based on race, color,
national origin, or sex.195 The explicit inclusion of partners will elimi
nate the arbitrary results of the per se rule and the disparate outcomes
that result when courts using the economic realities test consider dif
ferent factors and assign each factor a different weight.196

Other supporters of a broader interpretation of the application of
Title VII have proffered various solutions. One of the alternatives
would allow a partner to invoke the fiduciary duties created by the
partnership agreement if the partner wanted to bring a claim against
the firm alleging discrimination. 197 This proposal suffers from the same
deficiency as the per se rule based on the firm's chosen business form
- undue reliance on state enterprise organization law for determining
a party's rights under Title VII, a federal statute.198 This suggested
solution would be too limited to protect vulnerable parties because of
the reliance on the firm being organized as a partnership with a part
nership agreement. Another commentator suggests considering all
partners employees and permitting employers to rebut the presump
tion with evidence that the partner had sufficient managerial control

1 93. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (197 1 ). In Griggs, the Supreme Court
explained that the goal of Title VII is to:
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. . . .
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
Id. at 429-3 1 . See generally Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 ( 1989).
1 94. In Robinson v. Shelf Oil Co., the Court reasoned that the term "employee" must be
interpreted to include both current and former employees because a more narrow construc
tion would undermine the primary purpose of Title VII. 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1 997).
1 95. The statute "sets forth a congressional declaration that all persons within the juris
diction of the United States have a right to the opportunity for employment without dis
crimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin. It is also declared to be the
national policy to protect the right of persons to be free from such discrimination." H. R.
REP. No. 88-91 4 (1 963) (emphasis added). See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concur
ring).
1 96. See .mpra Part l.B and Part 1 1 .A-B.
1 97. See, e.g., Hishon, 467 U.S. at 70 (arguing that the contractual agreement between
the associates and the law firm triggers Title VII protections for associates).
1 98. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
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and economic power to ward off the discrimination.199 The solution
replicates the problems encountered when one applies the multi-factor
balancing test currently available under the economic realities test.200
Outcomes would differ according to the weight courts assign to the
various factors "considered in determining whether a defendant firm's
rebuttal evidence removes the partner from the definition of "em
ployee." Litigants would remain frustrated by their inability to predict
with certainty whether or not they had viable claims. At least one fed
eral appellate court judge has agreed that only federal action can
resolve this dispute definitively.201 Permitting partners to claim em
ployee status fulfills Congress's intent to use Title VII as a tool to feret
out discrimination in employment and equalize opportunities in all
work environments, regardless of whether employees share cubicles or
possess private offices with expensive leather couches and mahogany
desks.
CONCLUSION

This Note has demonstrated the insufficiency of the current stan
dards used to evaluate the partner-employee question. The diversity in
the forms and applications of the per se rule and economic realities
test exacerbates the dilemma. These tests fail to account for the differ
ences in the financial investment and management structure of mod
ern law firms. The purpose of Title VII is frustrated by courts' use of
these methods of analysis. This Note explained how interpreting Title
VII to include partners within the scope of the term "employee"
avoids the problems created by applying a per se rule or the economic
realities test. Bringing partners within the scope of the statute
effectuates the purpose of the statute and enables litigants to predict
their exposure to Title VII and to conform their behavior to the law.

199. See Dawn S. Sherman, Note, Partners Suing the Partnership: A re Courts Correctly
Deciding Who ls an Employer and Who Is an Employee under Title Vil?, 6 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 664-65 (2000).
200. See supra notes 1 66-180.
201 . Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 445-46 (6th Cir. 1996) (Daughtrey, J.,
concurring) ("Only by statutory modifications redefining the class of individuals to be pro
tected from such mistreatment can we ensure that hiring, promotion, and firing decisions are
undertaken with proper regard for the law of the land.").

